A TPDEARR Article
Trans-Pacific Dynamic Equity Allocation Research Report
The trans-Pacific macroeconomic environment is showing many signs of overall global recovery in the post-pandemic1 environment. As illustrated in the chart below, currency profiles around the Pacific are showing more mutually-distributed strength than in previous pandemic periods; more than half a dozen Asian and Latin American currencies have strengthened against the USD, while the USD itself has strengthened over the trailing twelve months against both the Chinese yuan (CNY) and the Japanese yen (JPY), the two other most widely used and deeply held trans-Pacific monies.
Virtually all TP economies have currencies which have strengthened against the CNY, highlighting what some believe to lackluster PRC economic growth post-pandemic, though we feel it’s certainly absurd to expect that all types of rebound or positive performance within the PRC might occur in any particular six month period just because a large cohort of market watchers have decided amongst themselves that operations “must” play out now that certain restrictions have been lifted. President Xi’s reorganization of some PRC market sectors to counter US/West technology blocking and trade restrictions has already made Chinese business more conscious of “national security” in general, but will still take time to fully play out in market valuations. The PRC is not done growing; the economy continues to rapidly move up the value chain, while also becoming more service-oriented (like those of other highly developed nations,) and the infrastructural advancements being pressed by Xi/CCP policy still have “story to tell” over the next 4-6 quarters.
As we hope that TPDEARR research regularly helps to illustrate, lots of different factors and market influences interplay to impact economic events simultaneously. Through the following sections on de-dollarization, levers and pulleys, and moral hazard, we hope to help shed light on how macroeconomic principles can inform equity investors (and all interested readers!) about contemporary market dynamics.
De-dollarization
A lot of hot air is blown about what’s being referred to as “de-dollarization”, or rather, trying to switch to the use of other, non-US currencies, regarding which form of “money” to hold in reserves and denote in contractual obligations, primarily. A couple of clarifications need to be made, however, in order to truly parse out the implications of what the de-dollarization debate concerns.
First of all, the very de-dollarization conversation itself directly points to the “dollarization” of the current economy; or, more precisely, the present debate highlights the current state of the highly-globalized economy which is, in all of its international-supply-chain glory, highly reliant upon both the ubiquity and the value of the US dollar (USD). That a single currency currently holds such a prominent position in global finance calls attention to the (economic and statistical) modeling that underlies the infrastructure of the world economy. All economically-developed nations rely upon mathematical and statistical models to inform their decision making. Though not all made-decisions agree with the information, the models (both macro-and microeconomic) exist and persist nonetheless; and, the decisions (virtually) all include at least some reference to financial values that are globally agreed upon, and that specifically reference the USD, or values based on a standard confirmed by the USD. The USD is the central reference around which all financial conversations ultimately orbit. So, although, in theory, it’s possible to de-dollarize, all that means is that the USD isn’t the central gravitational body any longer. All organizational context for the future global financial system is vague, obscure, undefined. This brings us to our next point of understanding.
The fundamental reason why dollarization has already occurred is largely based on the macroeconomic interpretation of strength. Around the turn of the Second Industrial Revolution, the US economy found itself positioned (through funding the rebuilding of post-WWII Europe, and with tremendously fortunate domestic circumstances for the capitalist class) to be the world’s primary banker, allowing it to become the richest and most economically dominant global economy.
Stability.
Consistency.
Dependability.
These are some of the most fundamental qualities required of a currency2. It’s impossible to price goods and services without these qualities. Economies cannot resist volatility long enough to survive without these qualities. If a nation wants to do large-scale business with another nation, say, for many months-worth of grain to feed a population underserved by its own resources, that business deal might take years, or decades, to play out financially. Without a stable currency within which contractual obligations can be measured and paid, such business deals are impossible to carry out, despite best intentions. It is the stability of the USD, in so many words, which lends it such a miraculous privilege as to be the prominent global currency. What other nation can offer such stability? Can they offer it today? Now? Immediately? Do their future prospects have the basis of (relative) statistical and historical stability that the USD has?3 Does their system of international relations have the same broad geostrategic network and omnipresence as is the case with the US? Basically all of these qualities in another single currency would need to exceed or surpass the current situation as offered by the USD, and no such contender presently exists.
Some nations are offering prospects of a global currency regime less dominated by a single central player, and more evenly dispersed among currencies controlled by member nations. The BRICS economies have recently discussed de-dollarizing, but statements have made clear that there is no single alternative currency being promoted as a replacement. Rather, they are stretching for the use of more of each others’ currencies as a means to rely less on the USD. In theory, this reduced USD reliance can play out to their advantage, giving them stronger ties to each other (and each others’ financial futures) in the process. However, like with all macroeconomic decisions, pulling part of the system in one or more new directions has rippling consequences throughout the entire economic system. The currency strength of the USD and its global access and interchangeability are sacrificed when less of it is held and used.
With specific respect to the PRC and Chinese yuan (CNY), despite the enormity of the Chinese economy in general, the current inability of other economies to believe that China is engaging in policies and actions with mutually beneficial pluralism is clear. The PRC continues to press forward with domestic and international policies that largely favor Han-centric dominance and privilege, and the subordination of co-parties to PRC superiority. This is not a great recipe for friendship. As long as it can be broadly agreed that the PRC is not interested in sharing, the CNY will suffer as a global currency contender. Financial analysis does not indicate that isolated, solely-self-interested economies manifest greater returns than does cooperation. The economy of the PRC is “a big ship”, so it cannot be steered quickly or easily; Xi Jinping is responsible for a difficult-to-control behemoth. Survival is more important than making partners, seems to be the contemporary view. Macroeconomic “mistakes” in China can and do have severe and long-lasting consequences.
Further, the PRC, in at least one sense, is lucky that the US and USD currently occupy the spotlight in many global matters. A lot of flak and fallout are heaped on the party in center stage, and the PRC has not had to bear the brunt of many international issues the same way as the US, allowing China to continue pressing forward with its agenda while avoiding the need to satisfy so many outside stakeholders in the international community. If the US somehow magically “fell”, and the rest of the world had to turn to the PRC to be “world police” and “world banker” and “funder of last resort” etc., the PRC’s (and, thereby, CCP’s) internal policies and goals would prohibit dependable and satisfactory results in the eyes of other global participants. In the US, right-wing ideology touts the mantra of “America First”, but in practice it doesn’t actually always play out that way economically. In the PRC, policy and practice both align to ensure things actually are China First. Though this has its advantages for China, international co-parties cannot get behind this approach macroeconomically, and it is likely that the CNY will continue to be used only for primarily China-involved transactions, not to refigure the dominant global currency regime.
A more likely option for de-dollarization, in our opinion, will be a digital currency or tokenized alternative, such as is currently being explored in many highly-developed economies, see the “Moral Hazard” section below for more. Decentralized financial (read: commercial banking) transactions using digital currency, however, are still a way off. Until then, it’s likely the world will diversify its holdings a little bit while still remaining predominantly dollarized.
Levers and Pulleys
Macroeconomics is a discipline studied by few, and understood by fewer. Unlike “kitchen table” budgeting, which is mostly simple arithmetic and absolute values contained and expensed in “envelopes”, the items and mechanisms that play out in macroeconomics have extended effects, multifaceted outcomes, triggering components that instigate other actions, and sometimes contradictory reactions. I hope this section instills, if nothing more, a sense that the macroeconomic system, as it were, operates as a network of Levers and Pulleys, wherein every action has numerous consequent reactions, and no singular impact on the overall economy. Even something as subtle as the public impression of a perceived future action (such as when traders, investors and industry players of all stripes attempt to “read between the lines” of the measured announcement from the Chair of the Federal Reserve, currently the brilliant and inimitable Janet Yellen) can have significant and costly downstream effects that impact elements of the macroeconomic landscape, like an employment or mortgage trend. Every macroeconomic decision trips levers and pulls pulleys in a cascading effect through time, making macroeconomics an extremely finicky discipline.
Let’s dive right into the thick of it with a relatively common domestic example. When the Fed “raises interest rates”, it essentially makes the cost of borrowing money more expensive. Though the Fed usually only directly manipulates one particular interest rate (the federal funds rate, aka the Fed Funds) that impacts the way commercial banks lend to each other, that one interest rate change ripples out and finds expression in myriad other interest rates and transactions. Naturally, when anything becomes more expensive it alters the makeup of parties who buy and sell that thing, in this case, money. Nobody wants to be the party screwed over paying extra, so each player in this game then alters their financial calculus to pass on the interest rate change to the next person, all the way down to the final human consumers. One interest rate change from the Fed has a pulley effect on virtually all interest rates in that economy. The Fed never directly changes the interest rate on your savings account or mortgage, but both of those rates are definitely, without a doubt, continuously being shifted and levered in coordination with the rate that the Fed does change. The prime rate, which determines how much interest consumers pay on loans, is also set by banks based on the then-current federal funds rate.
If the Fed (or any central bank) wants to have an impact on decisions that consumers make in the open marketplace, it cannot do that directly, but must pull a pulley here and trip a lever there, and hope that the resultant ripples have the desired effect. The Fed has very little legal authority, ultimately, to do much of anything to help consumers directly. It can’t force companies to lower prices. It can’t set mandatory mortgage rates. It can’t pay out cash to civilians. All it can do, again, is pull on one or two pulleys within its legal reach and try to entice the capitalists who dominate the economy to alter the way in which goods and services are priced and distributed.
Hopefully the mechanical effects of financial levers and pulleys are clear by now, but the buck doesn’t stop here. Beyond domestic concerns, international activity is constantly shifting the macroeconomic landscape from without. Another government abroad could begin to offer attractive investments at an interest rate that the Fed can’t match, which pulls on domestic capital and causes it to fly out of the national system and into foreign territory, shifting the balance sheets of companies and banks and causing them to have to alter their strategies in response. A natural catastrophe could devastate a particularly vital agricultural product from a foreign supplier and force global players to shift their demands to other domestic markets, seriously levering prices through major demand swings. Since no highly-developed economy exists in isolation, international adjustments must always be considered. But to make things even more convoluted, self-interest, competition and pride ensure that there is little agreement between nations about what actions exactly will result in ideal financial circumstances for any given economy. The answer is never perfectly agreed upon and clear, nor is it ever attainable through simple and direct actions by a single central bank.
And we’re not even done yet, folks. On top of all the pulling and levering done by central banks is the behavior of individual participants, namely, humans, who have individual psyches and social relations that have irrational and non-arithmetic impacts on spending vs. saving activity.
Where is the cutoff point wherein a newlywed couple determines that homebuying is not a viable option at the current moment? The answer differs for each individual.
What is the price at which an Average Joe deems a particular car, or stock, or movie ticket, to be too expensive? Again, it’s different for everyone.
What is the amount at which someone who works full-time feels confident in how much money they have saved?
How does each person in an economy perceive the current rate of inflation? What are they comparing it to? And how are they using present information to manipulate their future financial situation?
These questions point to an aspect of consumer spending that can be understood as universal financial individualism, wherein each and every person perceives and interprets macroeconomic phenomena both uniquely/individually as well as in concert with the sea of perceptions harbored by the social groups they occupy and consort with. The levers and pulleys of macroeconomic action affect individuals differently, individually, and so can never have a fully-shared and ubiquitous outcome. People will do with their money what they think is the right thing to do, but what they think changes over time based upon their individual circumstances. Macroeconomists and central banks have the impossible task of managing both the real and arithmetic consequences of monetary levers and adjustments, as well as the irrational and oft absurd expectations of individual human participants, whether they work in a hedge fund or a parking lot booth.
In the end, the survival goal for all economies (macroeconomically) is to avoid the pitfall of the majority of a populous believing that it is impoverished and without options, which inevitably results in mass formation and revolt; it is doubtful that any economy can survive such a circumstance. To endlessly thrive would be an ideal scenario, but thriving is relative, and everyone cannot thrive together. Central banks work hard to keep their economies’ heads above water, but it’s an endless game of levering and pulleying with no permanent resolution, no unanimously charred conclusions, and no paradise in the endgame. So I guess, when it’s all said and done, we could all use a little more macroeconomic sense to inform our perspective; and we would be wise to accept that the continual adjusting of our financial footing according to macroeconomic shifts and their rippling consequences is a fundamental feature of modern life.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is the general idea that individuals will expose themselves to increased risk if they believe they won’t have to fully experience the negative consequences associated with possible undesirable outcomes of their actions. A commonly referenced example is when it seems that governments will/must bail out big banks despite harms realized from their poor financial risk-taking, inspiring further riskiness, or worse. Central to the idea is the concept of risk, and therein is precisely where things get tricky, as therein lies an amorphous, subjective phenomenon and its intermingling with the human mind.
The Fed (and all central banks, more broadly) attempts to manage and stem the growth of moral hazard in an economy by telegraphing that poor risk-taking has serious consequences, but central banks cannot “prosecute” riskiness per se, and free market economics within capitalism-as-usual always results in the consolidation of large players into entities that are “too big to fail”. These largest of enterprises pose problems because their failure or dissolution would rip down other associated businesses and result in a cascade of economic destruction that ultimately harms (financially, at least) virtually everyone tied into that economy. Punishing them is difficult; too much and the punishment may result in cascading failure, too little and moral hazard increases in individuals who are willing to endure toothless, ineffective consequences. Again, it comes down to risk.
The risk we are discussing here, in particular, exists in both the institutional and individual levels, though they intertwine. Risk is always present as the future is unknowable, including future returns/capital flows, which are the lifeblood of business. More risk generally results in the possibility of higher returns more immediately, while simultaneously increasing the odds of total failure, total loss of capital. Whether it’s business or investing, the riskier something is, the greater chance of it not succeeding, but the higher the payout if it does. Since humans are the active agents within the economy, it is up to humans to determine what level of risk is acceptable in coordination with how much “return” is necessary in order to survive, prosper, or thrive. If only it were so easy…
Humans have split motivations in their financial decisions; they want to succeed in their careers, they want to succeed in the eyes of their superiors and peers, they want to have more money/escape poverty, they also want (in consumer-driven societies) to have a bunch of stuff that needs to be bought. Obviously, tradeoffs exist, but even the analysis of tradeoffs is highly subjective among people. Some individuals are more willing to take more risk than others given a set of circumstances. People can be more or less headstrong and confident than others, or more or less apprehensive about uncertainty. Shifting perceptions of consequences and their actual realizability only further multiply the possible ways in which individuals might approach a given situation. Managing risk perception within individuals, which is the essence of moral hazard, is an imperfect task. Identical information is not received and interpreted identically. Because of the unique individualism of human psychology, central banks definitively cannot articulate a single message with a single meaning about the macroeconomic environment.
Moreover, the digitization of equity markets has made investing more available to a larger swath of investors outside of the institutional silo, bringing in even more variation to participants’ behavior. The very idea of making returns on investments, in and of itself, introduces moral hazard to a society because the prospect of “getting rich” blinds (some) individuals to the potential loss of their financial lifeblood. The same psychological principle explains why lotteries are state-run systems; people will part themselves from their own financial livelihood when given the chance, so the chance must be managed and reduced for their own good. And the more people that participate, and the more money there is within the system as a whole, the greater the possible consequences, both positive and negative. Using money to make more money, the modus operandi of the capitalist class, is a morally hazardous idea, at least on the individual level, and frequently the institutional level as well.
How does this discussion of moral hazard pertain to investing throughout the Trans-Pacific economies? I’m glad you asked. Investors need to be vigilant about knowing the risks involved with their investments, or more precisely, the risks involved with loaning their capital to a company who will then in turn do something risky with it. If the overarching legal and regulatory systems overseeing that company in their industry do not or cannot manage moral hazard effectively, the risk level of that system is actually much greater than whatever is numerically reported.
Each country and economy handles these issues differently. If the entity is state-run, or the economy is state-dominated (like in the PRC), it is unlikely that the company will be severely punished from excessive risk-taking. Moral hazard (and the risk level) within these state-operated entities is high, because that government cannot be depended upon to punish itself in a way that would legitimately dampen excessive risk, nor can it be relied upon to truthfully disseminate the inner economic reality of the company, which might conflict with the public image of the company that the state wishes to uphold. Furthermore, with respect to the PRC in the current era of Xi Jinping, regulation over the past couple of years has rejiggered corporate management so that now the Communist Party of China (CCP) has authority even above a company’s executive board of directors… in the name of national security, of course45. Significant decision makers within these companies will not necessarily make decisions that are in the best interest of the company’s success and prosperity as-is but rather, decisions that are most likely to be rewarded by CCP leadership for their alignment with proposed policy. Or, when it comes down to it, individuals will lie in order to try to paint the best picture possible. Fancy financial footwork can go a long way before “push comes to shove,” as it were.
Remember, ambitious individuals can, and do, press the risk envelope.
In non-state-owned enterprises, the risk of collapse and loss of capital always exists. In a culture wherein regulation is light and points of “bad news” can be obfuscated, not only is moral hazard high, but small problems can grow and fester in darkness until they become large problems that cannot be fixed simply or easily. When a company is transparent about its shortcomings, it is easier to identify and rectify operational issues before they become enterprise-threatening. Investors should always seek to invest their capital into businesses that self-report honestly (as much as can be determined through external verification) and that shy away from excessive risk taking. Companies can have skyrocketing valuations ONLY through wider adoption of their goods/services by the public zeitgeist, never from self-reporting alone. No company can succeed in isolation. Always remember to read the economic terrain to determine if the scale of desired success is even possible, and do “smell tests” of information that seems too good to be true.
Lax regulatory oversight may lead to exaggerated successes in the short term, but rarely will an operation survive internal problems it tries to hide in the long term. Since the assets that are researched and highlighted in TPDEARR Squads are designed to be held for >12 months in order to realize long-term capital gains taxation, Squad investors will need to constantly be sifting through (and doubting!) overly-sensationalized reports of short-term success by target companies. As an investor, YOU are also the instigator of moral hazard in your own portfolio. Lead yourself away from temptation with the thought that things might not go your way. You have to survive and thrive throughout the entire year to be able to realize your gains and invest again next year.
Now that we’re just barely getting caught up to speed, the future comes upon us! Project Guardian: enter stage left.
Project Guardian is an initiative led by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS = Singapore’s central bank) and working in collaboration with the financial industry. Its purpose is to understand, assess and establish the feasibility and practicability of asset tokenization and decentralized finance “while managing risks to financial stability and integrity”6. In a recent paper titled Enabling Open and Interoperable Networks, Project Guardian explores how the digitization and tokenization of assets can actually play out in banking and monetary activity, as well as how the use of smart contracts and distributed, decentralized ledger technology can (and will) impact financial activity7.
While a full discussion of this broad topic merits worth, it pertains to our focus in particular because the introduction of smart contracts (which automatically engage financial transactions when certain metrics are measured) on decentralized networks removes a large chunk of human decision making from where it is currently employed. Does this remove risk? Some, sure, probably, while introducing new risks in other areas, no doubt. Rest assured, broad-scale DeFi will not be deployed until insurance/assurance and accountability can be fully realized by the governments and legal apparti charged with keeping track of such things, which means human individuals will need to be identifiable at key points throughout the operational schematic. Banking will NOT be overtaken by public, permissionless, non-verifiable parties for the demands of global commerce are too continuous and crucial to hinge on unaccountable participants. However, as the technology is gradually introduced in ways that can be relied on, it will shift the backdrop against which moral hazard can be measured, and the introduction of new risk factors and determinations will render the entire playing field (to humans) less comprehensible on the whole. The future is coming, and it’s going to be different.
It is impossible for central banks and governments to avoid moral hazard entirely; human participants and their suboptimal decision making will always affect the outcomes. Pay attention to how strictly industrial and financial sectors are monitored and regulated in target economies, and how rigorously violations of excessive risk-taking are punished.
Additional Notes
These days, the most major macroeconomic phenomena revolve around the two global poles: the PRC/CCP/CNY-centric East and the US/USD-centric West. TPDEARR issues over the past few quarters have explored elements of significant currency strengthening of the USD, the primary global reserve. However, the current period is much more marked by other observations, such as the serious weakening of the CNY, and notable strength coming from Latin American currencies across the board.
Along the Eastern Pacific seaboard, Latin America, broadly, encompasses the entire predominantly-Spanish-speaking diaspora throughout South, Central and North America, though even that vast description undervalues the economic ties therein. This part of the world can’t really be considered “the West” and is still “coming into its own” representation of itself on the world stage. Peru and Chile dominate most of the Pacific coast of South America and both have developed financial and equity markets that provide at least some access to foreign investors, thus we cover them in TPDEARR analysis, along with Mexico in North America.
According to the Pan American Health Organization, the populations within Latin American economies, as a whole, are relatively much younger than both in the West and in East Asia, and as they grow in both number and economic value, their economies will increase their ties and influence on the international community, making now the period of time before their larger future impact. Currency strengthening in conjunction with population and employment growth bodes well for economic returns and antifragility. Successful and well-supported companies that are ready for this leap into more-highly-developed global commerce will thrive, so we try our best to gauge their (perhaps) more-limited financial histories with their future potential. [SEP.23 Squad Asset #1] is a particularly well-positioned contender for strong future returns in the intermediate period throughout Latin America.
Currency strengthening within the leading Latin American economies with substantial access to trans-Pacific trade (namely, Mexico, Chile and Peru, as detailed in the chart below) puts them in a good position to capitalize on a relatively lower cost of imported input goods to advance and expand their infrastructure and broader industrial objectives. Significant players, many headquartered in Mexico, are already taking advantage of this in tandem with broader higher spending power among consumers and businesses throughout the region.
In “the East”, encompassing the Western Pacific Seaboard, the main headline of the trailing twelve month period is the lack of stellar economic expansion from the PRC, and the associated weakening of the CNY. Though this combination of effects depresses overall PRC GDP growth post-pandemic, its impacts, as previously discussed, assert themselves across myriad pulleys and levers.
The relative increase in costs of foreign goods slows the near-term expansion metrics, but the current thrust of the domestic economy is towards a “home-shoring” of industries and businesses critical to “national security”, as so dictated by the Xi administration and with the full authority of the CCP. The industrial expansion of tech-forward manufacturing in China will likely increase the dominant position the PRC already holds in many subsectors of global commerce in the intermediate-term. Furthermore, the relative increase in price-attractiveness of exported goods by foreign buyers bodes well for intermediate-term exports and overall global demand for Chinese-produced goods. We are again flirting with an era of “cheap Chinese goods”, only this time the period will be much more truncated, and the goods are actually much higher value than in previous such periods, so be prepared for their relative prices to shoot back up as the PRC economy continues its overarching development and advancement. Remember, the PRC is not a democracy; its citizens cannot vote for their leader or future path. This is Xi’s economy to steer and manage as best he can, and (now that he has successfully removed term limits) it may still be his for 50 more years. In China, it is a long-game scenario unlike anywhere anyone else in the Western world has to deal with domestically. Because China is the economic center of Asia, all Asian economies have to contend with an economic orbit that exhibits fundamentally different behaviors than does the US or EU.
Trans-Pacific Currency Profiles
(trailing-twelve-month performance)
| (Target) | (Reserve) | (Reserve) | (Reserve) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CURRENCY | USD | CNY | JPY |
| USD | ———– | 6.01 | 3.70 |
| CNY | -5.67 | ———– | -2.80 |
| JPY | -3.59 | 2.86 | ———– |
| KRW | 3.29 | 9.50 | 5.91 |
| TWD | -3.81 | 2.55 | –0.25 |
| VND | -2.24 | 3.66 | 1.30 |
| THB | 2.07 | 7.63 | 4.09 |
| SGD | 2.49 | 8.09 | 6.27 |
| PHP | 0.22 | 6.25 | 2.92 |
| MYR RM | -3.81 | 2.30 | -0.72 |
| IDR Rp | -3.54 | 2.54 | -0.88 |
| AUD | -6.78 | -0.50 | -3.34 |
| NZD | -3.94 | 2.52 | -0.17 |
| CAD | -4.44 | 1.10 | -0.88 |
| MXN | 13.03 | 19.80 | 17.22 |
| CLP | 0.90 | 4.25 | 4.79 |
| PEN S. | 4.73 | 11.10 | 8.45 |
- We understand that there has never yet been a point in which society has rid itself of the coronavirus, so we use the term “post-pandemic” only to refer to the period succeeding the roughly three-year-long fervor that began in March 2020 and spread throughout the world, resulting in lockdowns and major supply chain disruptions, skewing economic metrics in companies around the world. Post-pandemic is one way of referring to “the new normal”, now that mindsets have adapted and businesses have explored reorientations to more readily accommodate future similar disruptions. ↩︎
- For example, oceanic shipping vessels are scheduled not according to how fast they can actually get from one port to another. Rather, they are scheduled and planned in accordance with how predictable, low and stable the costs of fuel for transportation will be, which results in a far slower shipping speed. Fuel transportation costs, in and of themselves, are determined in coordination with the ongoing buying and selling of futures contracts, by either the shipping companies themselves, or by their owners on their behalf, on financial exchanges, both to help defray the costs of inflation as well as to hedge against the volatility ever present in historically temperamental fossil fuel asset prices. These futures contracts are predominantly denominated in, you guessed it, the USD. ↩︎
- Additionally, the field of contemporary statistics, itself, is largely Western-originated. The prevalence of white males in the field will likely continue to perpetuate implicit and confirmation biases about the exaggerated significance of Western culture in Human history. The effort has manufactured a difficult-to-shed system of incomplete data masquerading as information. ↩︎
- https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3045053/china-cements-communist-partys-role-top-its-soes-should ↩︎
- https://www.merics.org/en/report/comprehensive-national-security-unleashed-how-xis-approach-shapes-chinas-policies-home-and ↩︎
- https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/project-guardian ↩︎
- https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas-media-library/development/fintech/project-guardian/project-guardian-open-interoperable-network.pdf ↩︎
tkscm, limited 